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PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 
The African Great Lakes Region (GLR) has witnessed some of the most intense 
violence and protracted conflict of the last half-century. There has been spiralling 
and  sometimes  over-lapping  conflict  in  Burundi,  Rwanda,  Uganda  and  the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (hereinafter Zone 1 conflict states). Yet their 
neighbours—Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania  and Zambia (hereinafter Zone 2  peaceful 
states)—have  remained  generally  peaceful.  This  article  asks  what  makes  the 
difference in conflict outcomes between these neighbouring states? It has one goal: 
to identify a set of structural and historical factors (if any), that differentiate the zone 
1 from the zone 2 states and which can explain the incidence of conflicts across 
time and countries. We set out to document and estimate the impact of a common 
set of structural factors that underpin the outbreak of wars in this region over the 




Lupa  Ramadhani  is  an  assistant  lecturer  at  the  University  of  Dar  es  Salaam, 
Tanzania. He obtained a Master of Arts (2002) in International Relations and is 
currently a PhD candidate in the UCD Global Human Development ―Sandwich‖ PhD 
programme. Publications include ―Peace and Conflict in the Great Lakes Region 
Since  2004‖,  Conflict  Trends  (ACCORD),  Vol.  2,  2005,  co-authored  with  Prof. 
Mwesiga Baregu. 
 
Jennifer Todd is Director of the Institute for British Irish Studies, School of Politics 
and  International  relations,  University  College  Dublin.  She  has  published 
extensively on Northern Ireland politics and on comparative ethnic conflict.  
 
 
Patrick  Paul  Walsh  is  a  Professor  of  International  Development  Studies  in  the 
School of Politics and International Relations at UCD. He is on the managment 
comittee of the Geary Institute. He coordinates UCDs HEA-Irish Aid Programme of 
Strategic Cooperation 2007–2011. This Programme runs a flagship "Sandwich or 
Swedish Model" UCD Ph.D. in Global Human Development, among other things. 
He also chairs a TCD-UCD Masters in Development Practice that is part of a Global 
Network  based  at  the  Earth  Institute  at  Columbia  University  and  funded  by  the 
MacArthur Foundation. 
       PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
       
       
  - 1 - 
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The African Great Lakes Region (GLR) has witnessed some of the most intense 
violence and protracted conflict of the last half-century. While many of the events 
were intra-state, the conflict literature is beginning to connect them as part of a 
conflict matrix in the GLR.
1 There has been spiralling and sometimes over -lapping 
conflict in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
(hereinafter Zone 1 conflict states). Yet their neighbours—Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania 
and  Zambia  (hereinafter  Zone  2  peaceful  states)—have  remained  generally 
peaceful. This article asks what makes the difference in conflict outcomes between 
these neighbouring states? How did one group of poor states avoid conflict while 
their neighbours suffered it? How, with flows of refugees from neighbouring wars 
and close proximity, did zone 1 states remain peaceful while their neighbours in 
zone  2  were  engulfed  in  conflict?  What  explains  the  radical  difference  between 
otherwise comparable countries?  
This article has one goal: to identify a set of structural and historical factors (if any), 
that  differentiate  the  zone  1  from  the  zone  2  states  and  which  can  explain  the 
incidence of conflicts across time and countries. We do not attempt to look at the 
specific events that triggered wars, or the different intensities and course of war in 
the  different  countries,  or  the  specific  mechanisms  that  reproduced  or  deterred 
conflict in each country. Rather we set out to document and estimate the impact of 
a common set of structural factors that underpin the outbreak of wars in this region 
over the past fifty years, while controlling for time and country specific effects. 
In the first section of the article, we outline the trends of violent conflict in the GLR 
which are to be modelled in a simple linear probability model below. In the second 
section, we briefly review the literature and propose plausible hypotheses. In the 
third section, we outline the methodology and data used to estimate the probability 
of  war and its relationship  to a set of  structural factors, controlling for time and 
country specific effects. In the subsequent sections we review in detail the results 
for each hypothesis. In concluding, we overview the core results of the paper and 
outline the research questions it raises for the future.  
TRENDS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT IN THE GLR 
From 1960 to 2010, 86 conflict-episodes were recorded in the GLR: 35 in Uganda; 
19 in Burundi; 19 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 11 in Rwanda.
2 Only 
two conflict-episodes happen in our peaceful Zone 2, both in Kenya. In figure 1 we 
sum the conflicts in each decade by zones of conflict. We can observe that the 
number of conflicts increased as we moved   through the decades in the conflict 
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Even though we do not model the intensity of the wars, we document in figure 2 the 
average number of battle-related deaths per year for each decade. The numbers of 
deaths increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, and remained very high in 
the 2000s. In these decades, over 100,000 people per year lost their lives in the 
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This increase in numbers of conflicts and continuation of intensity is atypical, since 
globally the numbers of conflicts have decreased since the early 1990s and the 
likelihood of settlement has increased.
3 Moreover in the GLR, as figure 3 shows, 
serious  outbreaks  of  war  h ave  become  increasingly  clustered,  with  sequential 
outbreaks in the zone 1 countries.  
 
Figure 3: Conflicts Associated with Death > 800 people 
Burundi Burundi
Burundi










































In what follows, we attempt to model the probability of conflict as a function of a set 
of structural factors that induce a higher probability of war, controlling for time and 
country specific effects. Our focus is specifically upon structural factors - both those 
which are historically given and those that vary over time. We do not model path 
dependency (lagged dependent variables) in our modelling of conflict, for example 
the view that the history of war explains the current war. Nor do we model diffusion 
and contagion effects (when one state goes to war it pulls in others or encourages 
them  to  copy).  We  rather  attempt  to  identify  a  set  of  structural  features  which 
increase states‘ vulnerability to conflict. Some of these factors may themselves be 
produced  by  past  conflict;  some  may  make  states  vulnerable  than  others  to 
contagion  and  diffusion  effects.  But  this  is  not  part  of  the  specific  explanation 
offered here. Nor do we attempt to explain the varying intensity of conflict within 
each state, or the processes and paths of conflict resolution. 
THE LITERATURE: GENERATING PLAUSIBLE HYPOTHESES 
There is a developed literature on each of the states in the GLR, which we use 
primarily  as  background  material  in  developing  hypotheses  and  interpreting 
results.
4 In each of the states, the social bases of ―ethnicity‖, the numbers, divisions       PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
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and  resources  of  the  different  groups,  and  their  access  to  the  state  differs.  For 
example, to take only the conflict-ridden states, in Rwanda and Burundi, a common 
cultural and linguistic base was overlain by a dyadic social structure imposed during 
the period of Belgian colonisation, with very strong horizontal inequality (whereby 
colonially defined Tutsi elite was opposed to Hutu majority): the dominant political 
group differed in each state, although in each with genocidal results.
5 The history of 
Uganda, in contrast, is a permanent imprin t of the Buganda Kingdom—it is one of 
few places in Africa that had developed a strong ―nation state‖ before the onset of 
colonialism—coinciding  with  religious  rivalries,  and  a  territorial  division  of  labour 
between North and South.
6 The intense violence of the early decades took place 
during  the  brutal  military  dictatorship  of  Idi  Amin .  Meanwhile  the  Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) is a vast territory with an area of 2,345,410 square 
kilometres and a population of 68 million divided into 250 ethnic groups (including a 
large  Rwandan  population)  of  varied  religious  background  although  majority 
Christians.
7 It has a long history of intense and brutal violence dating from the days 
of  slave  trade  in  the  16th  Century  and  encompassing  intense  violence  and 
population  displacement  in  the  colonial  period.
8  The  vast  resources  are  held 
responsible for attracting imperial forces in the country that have in turn played on 
ethnic divisions. This practice continued in the post -colonial period, as did the 
repertoires of violence. Meanwhile studies of Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia 
show different interrelations of ethnicity, inequality and the state. Tanzania, for 
example, has over 120 disparate groups and yet it has been the most peaceful of 
the zone 2 countries with fewer outbreaks even of relatively minor violence. It also 
took some of the boldest measures to ensure that ethnicity did not impact on state 
functioning:  compulsory  national  service,  promotion  of  Kiswahili  as  a  national 
language,  rural  resettlement  into  Uj amaa  (communal)  villages,  nationalization 
(including of land), adoption of socialism and self-reliance principles, etc. Kenya, by 
contrast, inherited better developed infrastructure at independence and is still a 
regional hegemonic power. It also inherited one dominant ethnic group from British 
colonial practices, the Kikuyu, and although relative peace has been maintained, 
the Kikuyu factor has remained a key component of governance.
9  
Given the different histories and conditions of each country, are there   common 
factors which explain the patterns of conflict? One hypothesis  - which we treat as 
the  null  hypothesis  to  be  accepted  only  if  none  of  the  other  hypotheses  are 
confirmed - is that no such factors exist:  
H1: the causes of conflict are sui generis within each state.  
Our substantive hypotheses, however, suppose that there are underlying structural 
and/or  historical  commonalities  that  explain  the  difference  between  country 
outcomes in the conflict-ridden (zone 1) and peaceful (zone 2) states in the GLR.  
There is an extensive quantitative literature on the factors associated with violent 
conflict. However the data sets cover a very diverse set of countries and conflicts.
10 
By  comparing  only  a  small  range  of  states   similar  in  terms  of  economic 
development,  state  capacity,  their  ―newness‖  (all  post-WWII)  states,  and  their 
mutual proximity, yet very different in terms of conflict outcomes, we are able to       PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
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look more closely at the underlying structural factors, historical and otherwise, that 
make  some  states  significantly  more  vulnerable  to  violence  than  others.  The 
different outcomes in zone 2, otherwise broadly similar in socio-economic profile, 
provide us with an excellent control group of countries. Taking this set of cases 
allows us to set aside some factors which are correlated with conflict in the large-n 
literature, but which are common to all the states in the GLR. 
Poverty is highly correlated with violent conflict: the World Development Report of 
2011 points out that ―Slow-developing low-income economies largely dependent on 
natural resources are 10 times more likely than others to experience civil war.‖
11 All 
the GLR countries are poor, the peaceful zone 2 states as much as the conflict-
ridden zone1 states, as figures 4 and 5 below show. To construct these graphs, we 
used a measure of income poverty—GDP Per Capita Per Day in 1990 US$ and 
corrected for purchasing power (Converted at Geary Khamis PPPs). The data is 
constructed from the Total Economy Database at the University of Groningen. This 
represents the average outcome and does not tap into internal income inequalities. 
On  these  figures,  zone  1  countries  are  no  poorer  than  zone  2  countries.  All 
countries show the common cyclical character of economic development in Africa 
where commodity price movements dominate standards of living, and where living 
standards often come perilously close to the accepted extreme ―poverty‖ measure 
of less than 1 US dollar per day. If we compare the average outcome per person 
per day with their ex-colonial masters, we see the average person in Belgium and 
Britain living on 20 US dollars a day in 1960 which gradually increases, without 
much volatility, to 65 US dollars a day by 2010.  
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Conflict is associated with weak rather than strong states.
12 In our comparison both 
the strongest state in the region (Uganda) and the weakest (DRC) have seen some 
of the most intense violence. It is associated with refugee movement,
13 but of the 
three  largest  receivers  of  refugees  from  conflict  zones —Tanzania,  Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambi—aonly one has itself experienced successive 
conflicts. Conflict has sometimes been argued to be associated with the absence of 
democracy,
14 but as we discuss below, the birth of democracy was a factor that 
triggered conflict in our zone 1 states. Indeed for most of time (88%) for most of? 
the decades under analysis, both zone 1 conflict and zone 2 peaceful states were 
governed by some form of dictatorship. 
Are there underlying factors that explain the different conflict outcomes in the two 
zones? We take six hypotheses from the existing literature that we judge to have 
initial plausibility for this region. For each of these hy potheses, we take a proxy 
measure  which  allows  us  to  test  them  quantitatively  over  a  fifty  year  period, 
comparing outcomes in zone 1 and zone 2 countries. The hypotheses, derived from 
the comparative literature and discussed elsewhere in this volume, are as follows 
H2: Violent conflict is caused by a cluster of factors, not just one.
15 
H3: Structural-historical factors are important in setting in motion a path of conflict
16 
(proxy: colonial power-holder, Britain or Belgium).  
H4:  Political  exclusion  is  a  cause  of  conflict
17  (proxy: democracy vs civilian vs 
military dictatorships).       PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
       
       
  - 7 - 
H5: Economic opportunities, not least the future prospects of individual and group 
advance,  make  violent  conflict  less  likely
18  (proxy: openness to trade, overseas 
development aid).  
H6:  Civil  society  restrains  from  violent  conflict
19  (proxy:  demographic 
characteristics, proportion of population under 14 years; life expectancy). 
H7:  Ethnic  division  makes  violent  conflict  more  likely
20  (proxy:  linguistic  and 
religious fractionalisation). 
We are aware that the proxy measures are far from adequate to the theoretical 
intuitions behind the hypotheses, and we do not claim that they are the only 
possible  proxy  measures.  However  they  do  capture  key  aspects  of  historical, 
cultural, economic, social   and political processes.
21  The qualitative discussions 
which follow allow us to show their relevance and the mechanisms by which they 
produce conflict.  
METHODOLOGY 
Our data set, primary sources and summary statistics are documented in Table 1.        PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
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Table 1 
 
Data 1960-2010  Source  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min      Max 
Conflict =1 if there 
is a least 25 battle-
related deaths per 
year Conflict = 0, 
otherwise. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators: Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program: Battle-
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Dataset, version 6Apr11. 
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Hadenius & Teorel 2005 l—
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In general, as written in equation (1), we estimate the probability of a Conflict = 1 
event as a linear function of a set of structural indicators and controls for time and 
country specific (random) effects. Our measure of conflict is specific to country j in 
time period t. We have 8 countries over 51 years. As outlined in table 1 we have 
controls  for  history  that  do  not  vary  over-time.  In  addition  we  have  controls  for 
Economic International Integration, Social Structure and Political Regimes that do 
vary across country and time.  
    jt j t t jt l j k X jt Time EconSocPol History Conflict E
jt              0 | 1
     (1)  
We estimate a basic model without country specific (random) effects in our error 
structure and then we estimate a probit regression with random effects. The results 
of these estimations are documented in Table 2 together with the marginal effects 
of these structural factors. Rather than empirically describe the results we discuss 
each factor separately, referring back to the statistical significant of each variable 
and marginal effect.  
 
Table 2: Probit Regression with and without Country Specific Random Effects 1960-2008 
Probability of a Conflict Episode   Model I  Model II  Marginal Effects 
History  




















Economic International Integration 




















(Default Institutionalized Democracy) 






Country Specific Random Effects  No  Yes  No 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2  .52    .52 
Observations  328  392  328 
*t-Statistics in brackets. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variable in question.  
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HISTORICAL FACTORS 
Colonial Origin 
In  the  introduction  to  this  volume,  Ruane  and  Todd  suggest  that  the  history  of 
colonialism may set in place particular configurations of conflict which take on path-
dependent properties that are particularly hard to break, even long after the colonial 
period is over. Is this the case in the GLR? The range of cases allows us to test the 
effects of British versus Belgium colonial presence. The results in Table 2 show that 
a history of Belgian colonization is highly correlated with the presence of conflict: a 
former Belgian colony has a 33% higher chance of war in any year of the 51 years, 
than does a former British colony.  
Why this is so requires further exploration since the British colonial presence was 
by  no  means  always  benign.  Even  in  our  case  studies,  Uganda  (an  ex  British 
colony) is among the high-violence zone 1 cases. We suggest that it is a function of 
the mode of colonial administration, and in particular the forms of indirect rule. The 
Belgian practice was to use and augment previous distinctions to define a local 
ruling elite - going as far as giving identity cards to distinguish Tutsi and Hutu in 
Burundi and Rwanda, and displacing whole populations in the Southern DRC to 
maximize the economic exploitation of the region.
22 The British also followed the 
practice  of  indirect  rule —in  Ireland,  in  Uganda—although  without  the  legal 
inflexibility of Belgian imperial rule. However, in the other GLR countries, indirect 
rule  was highly moderated for a  variety  of contingent reasons. In Tanzania, the 
British presence was relatively short lived, taking control of Tanganyika as a UN 
trusteeship  having  defeated  the  former  colonial  power—Germany—in  WWI,  and 
there was no obvious ethnic group to favour for indirect rule. In Rhodesia, white 
settlers were concentrated in the Southern part of the colony, and—having failed to 
include the Northern area (to become Zambia)  with  Malawi  in a federation—the 
British focused their attention on the South. Only in Kenya, in our zone 2 countries, 
did  indirect  rule  definitively  favour  the  one  ethnic  group  (the  Kikuyu)  and  this 
remains a feature of tension even in contemporary Kenya.
23 In short, our results tap 
into a particular mode of imperial territorial management —via indirect rule which 
privileges one indigenous population over another, thus cementing cultural as well 
as economic division and making boundaries exclusive. Theoretically, there is good 
reason to believe that this mode of governance is likely to be conflict-generating 
into the future.
24 Our empirical evidence shows that it is.  
Cultural Fractionalization 
The GLR states have very different internal cultural divisions and cleavages. The 
relative extent of linguistic and of religious fractionalization in 1961 (the historical 
start-point of analysis) is shown in figure 6 below.
25 Table 2 shows that one unit 
increase in linguistic fractionalization, within the scale of 0 to 1, will increase the 
chance of conflict by 1 per cent. Religious fractionalization has the opposite effect, 
with  marginal  changes  reduci ng  the  chance  of  conflict  by  2  per  cent .  Highly 
religiously fractionalized states are less likely to experience violent conflict, while 
states with more even religious divisions are more likely to engage in conflict.        PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
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Several points are worth noting here. First, while language is typically used as a 
proxy for ethnicity, religion is much more evident as a divisive feature in this region. 
Secondly, as Coakley has pointed out, fractionalization per se is a bad measure of 
potential for conflict: other things equal, a highly fractionalized society is less likely 
to have persistent conflict than a dyadic one.
26 Linguistic fractionalization may well 
prevent  communication  and  m ake  more  difficult  the  mechanisms  of  conflict -
avoidance, both at local and wider levels. But it is the massive religious divisions —
between 50% and 60% in most of the conflict states—which provide a legitimation 
for  antagonism.  Indeed  in  this  set  of  cases,  it  is  the  clustering  of  religious 
fragmentation at the 50-60% level in zone 1 that is most clearly correlated with 
conflict outbreaks.  
A closer comparison of the two zones, however, bears out the conclusions of the 
wider  literature  that  ethnic  diversity  does  not  of  itself  determine  violent  conflict. 
Linguistic  fragmentation  was  as  evident  in  Tanzania  as  in  DRC  and  Uganda  in 
1961,  and  in  Tanzania  the  religions  (in  particular  Christianity  and  Islam)  were 
dyadic. However in  Tanzania linguistic fractionalization  was  overcome by strong 
educational  and  cultural  policies  (promotion  of  Kiswahili  as  the  language  of  the 
state),  and  the  potential  effects  of  religio-ethnic  division  overcome  by  prudent 
constitutional politics and political practices.
27  
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The GLR states differ markedly in their openness to trade and their receipt of 
international development assistance, with zone 2 countries much more likely to 
score more highly on these measures in the last two decades. This is documented 
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1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
By Conflict Zones and Decades
Openess ODA
 
Of course the fact of intense violence and military dictatorships in zone 1 regions 
may itself deter trade and aid or even change the composition of such aid; this is 
likely to be only short-term effect(s). Over the 50  year period,  we see dips and 
unevenness in the conflict zone, and—particularly from the 1980s, a steady rise in 
openness and aid in the peaceful zone. Although the effects at the margins are 
small (see table 2 above), since the substantive amounts of trade and aid are high, 
the effects on conflict are far from insignificant. Whether they are due—on the one 
hand—to  the  openness  to  wider  norms  and  standards,  or  to  the  possibilities  of 
future change held open by international linkages, or to both, is not evident on this 
data and would require closer qualitative study. However it shows that increased 
international  economic  interactions  are  associated  with  a  reduced  probability  of 
conflict in this region, and indeed helped the peaceful zones to remain peaceful 
during the 1990s and 2000s. 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Violent conflict has many effects, among them a demographic hollowing out of the 
male  population  and  often—given  sexual  violence  rife  in  GLR  conflicts—an 
additional source of HIV and Aids, decimating the entire sexually-active cohorts. A 
socio-demographic factor which clearly differentiates zone 1 and zone 2 states is 
the percentage of the population under 14 years: clearly higher in zone 1 countries 
as is shown in table 2 above and in figure 8 below, and particularly so in the crucial 
decades of 1990s and 2000s. Equally life expectancy is significantly higher in zone 
2 states.
28 
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In the wider literature, there has been some discussion of the relationship between 
the share of youth in the population and the risk of violent conflict: in particular, the 
―youth bulge‖ between 15-24 has been the focus of attention, since it is this cohort 
which is most likely to join militant groups. Most recently, Fearon has not found 
strong evidence to support this linkage.
29 Our findings show a definite correlation 
between the still younger age group (under 14) and outbreaks of violent conflict . 
This is highly likely to be in part a result of violence. However it also has a feedback 
effect, and not simply in the availability of youth recruits for rebel armies. We know 
that cross-communal civil society organizations are strong predictors of peace 
rather than conflict, and that even intra-communal civil society organizations favour 
inter-communal peace.
30 Strong organizational networks and authority structures at 
the grass roots level prevent small scale violence escalating into larger scale, and 
provides a stabilizing force against those  ―ethnic entrepreneurs‖ or warlords who 
might benefit from violence. And these civil society organizations are always adult 
organizations, their existence undermined by the effects of war. It is thus highly 
plausible  that  as  these  constraints  on  violence  are  eroded,  violent  conflict 
escalates.  
In Zone 2 countries, in contrast, the society, to varying degrees, was sewn together 
through common threads. Kenya for instance is known for its Harambee tradition. 
Harambee was a government initiative to get the whole society involved in solving 
immediate problems surrounding them in a self help basis. Communities would pull 
together meager resources for a common good. This is also observed in Tanzania 
where civil society supplements the state in a range of ways.
31        PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
       
       
  - 14 - 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
An extensive literature on the ―democratic peace‖ suggests that democracies are 
less  likely  than  other  regimes  to  experience  violent  conflict.
32  African  history, 
however, suggests that the process of democratization may be a difficult and 
dangerous one, liable to produce violent conflict. Indeed ―benign dictators‖ may be 
much more likely to build national unity and preclude ethnic violence than simple 
democracies. As outlined in Table 1 we use an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) of 
Institutionalized  Democracy  to  construct  a  Dictatorship  =  1  if  the  score  of 
Institutionalized Democracy < 3. Dictatorship = 0, otherwise. For most of the data 
most  of  these  countries  have  some  form  of  dictatorship.  Overall,  we  find  that 
democracy increases the likelihood of conflict by 10 per cent when compared to a 
dictatorship over this period.  
Indeed the raw probabilities mapped in Figure 9 show that the single type of regime 
most likely to give rise to conflict is a presidential democracy (admit within fewer 
periods),  while  periods  during  traditional  royal  dictatorships  and  military 
dictatorships are less likely to be correlated with violent outbreak.  
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While democracy makes conflict more likely in our data set, it is also the case that 
democracy has been more prevalent in the peaceful zone 2 countries than in the 
conflict-ridden  zone  1  countries,  as  shown  in  Table  3.  The  preponderance  of 
democracies, 18 per cent of the periods, in zone 2 has to be seen in the context of 
democratization in the 1990s  which  was significantly  more  successful and more 
peaceful in these states, following and usually guided by civilian dictatorships, than 
it  was  in  zone  1,  following  typically  military  dictatorships  for  most  of  the  time 
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Table 3: 
Political Regime  Zone 1  Zone 2 
Presidential Democracy   7  18 
Civilian Dictatorship      33  82 
Military Dictatorship  55  - 
Royal Dictatorship   3  - 
 
The distinction between civilian and military dictators taps into the well-documented 
qualitative distinction in forms of leadership in the early post-colonial years in the 
GLR. Where there was strong leadership, relatively strong institutions emerged to 
navigate through the uncertain global politics of the 1960s and challenges of state 
building. The early rise of military dictatorship in the countries of zone 1 especially 
the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda had lasting impact on peace. The main distinction 
between DRC, Burundi and Rwanda in this respect is that the DRC had a more 
stable  military  dictatorship  that  dominated  the  scene  for  three  decades,  while 
Burundi and Rwanda had a succession of them. In contrast, the civilian-dictator 
leaders of the zone 2 countries had a much clearer vision of national unity: Zambia 
(humanism), Tanzania (socialism) and Kenya (African socialism). Indeed Uganda 
too  began  with  a  strong  ―Common  Mans  Charter‖,  although  this  was  soon 
overthrown  by  the  long  military  dictatorship  of  Idi  Amin.  The  success  of  civilian 
dictators  in  nation-building  in  the  early  decades  in  the  zone  2  countries  gave  a 
context more conducive to peaceful democratization than in the zone 1 countries. 
Indeed in Tanzania, the process of democratization was carefully managed to limit 
the politicization of ethnic divisions.
33  
CONCLUSION 
Our  conclusion  is  that  there  are  significant  underlying  causes  of  the  conflict-
proneness of zone 1 states and the relative peacefulness of zone 2 states. Zone 1 
states  began  the  period  of  independence  with  serious  vulnerabilities:  particular 
forms of colonialism interlocked with ethnic divisions to produce conflict potential. 
However this was far from determining. It was the addition of other factors - military 
dictatorships,  an  isolation  from  the  wider  economy,  and,  particularly  as  violence 
developed, a hollowing out of the adult population and a destruction of civil society, 
that produced high conflict risk. While our data gives support to H3-H7, no single 
factor is decisive in producing conflict. It is the clustering of factors in zone 1 states, 
as predicted in H2 that radically increases the risk of conflict. Equally, a clustering 
of ―positive‖ indicators radically lessens the risk of conflict. Zone 2 states began 
with a more favourable historical conjuncture, but it was subsequent choices and 
events, openness to international trade and aid, civilian dictatorships with strong 
integrative  ideologies,  that  permitted  the  building  of  cultural,  political  and  civil 
society barriers—as if an immune system—against conflict.  
The result was that the states in each of the two zones had very different capacities 
to  respond  to  conflict-generating  challenges.  This  is  seen  most  clearly  in  two 
phenomena of the 1990s. The first is the process of democratization, which tends 
to produce new tensions and highlight older grievances. In the zone 1 countries it 
triggered  conflicts.  Yet  it  was  managed  peacefully  in  the  zone  2  countries.  The 
second is the ―diffusion‖ effect of conflict as flows of refugees and armed groups       PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
       
       
  - 16 - 
from one conflict-state helped destabilize another. In zone 1 countries, this posed 
an almost insuperable problem, pushing even those which had temporary peace 
back  to  war.  In  zone  2  states  in  contrast,  the  refugee  flows  were  perceived  as 
dangers but ones that could be successfully managed, for example by Zambia and 
Tanzania, who hosted very large numbers of refugees.  
Our  analysis  in  this  paper  is  not  complete,  even  in  explaining  the  difference 
between zone 1 and zone 2 countries. However the factors that we have identified 
as important in this explanation tap into broader processes generally recognized in 
the literature to be conflict generating: the historical factors are proxies for indirect 
rule  that  crystallizes  horizontal  inequalities;  the  regime  variables  tap  into  the 
importance  of  leadership  in  avoiding  conflict,  and  of  military  power  and  human 
rights abuses in generating it; the economic variables tap into general values of 
openness and perceived opportunities; the social factors into the importance of civil 
society, or its absence, in explaining the difference between peaceful and violent 
states.  While  more  work  needs  to  be  done  to  identify  the  mechanisms  which 
reproduce or insulate from conflict, we have argued that there is good evidence—
both quantitative and qualitative—for hypotheses H2-H7 in this case.  
The  article  also  holds  out  policy-relevant  morals:  not  least,  that  when  states 
themselves lose any immune response to conflict risk, it behoves their neighbours 
and  the  wider  international  community  to  help  rebuild  that  capacity.  Their 
neighbours  are  already  doing  so  by  concerted  efforts  to  build  a  regional 
organization able to limit refugee and arms flows.
34 The international community 
can help not just by conflict mediation but by continuing, indeed intensifying aid and 
trade.  
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